Mossadegh

Based on academic research, the portrayal of Mohammad Mossadegh as simply a “democratic patriot” is indeed incomplete and requires significant nuance. Here’s the counter-narrative supported by scholarly evidence:

Constitutional and Legal Issues

Not Democratically Elected: Multiple scholars point out that Mossadegh was never directly elected by popular vote. Under Iran’s 1906 Constitution, the Shah had sole authority to appoint and dismiss prime ministers, with only an advisory vote from the Majlis (parliament) . Article 46 of the Constitutional Law explicitly stated: “The appointment and dismissal of Ministers is effected by virtue of the Royal Decree of the King” .

Authoritarian Drift in Power

Increasingly Undemocratic Governance: Academic Darioush Bayandor, a former Iranian diplomat and UN official, argues that Mossadegh’s rule should be assessed in two periods. While his early months were remarkable, he “clearly failed to uphold and consolidate democracy” . Key evidence includes:

• Fraudulent Referendum: In August 1953, Mossadegh held what critics called a “fraudulent referendum” to dismiss the Majlis (parliament), effectively concentrating power in his hands

• Rigged Elections: The Australian Institute of Jewish and Community Affairs notes that “the one-time champion of the rule of law now rigged elections and unleashed crowds to intimidate political opponents”

• Constitutional Violations: After July 1952, Mossadegh “asked and obtained from the majles full legislative powers infringing on the prerogatives both of the crown and the parliament”

Academic Criticism of Democratic Credentials

Scholarly Assessment: The middle-class coalition that initially supported him gradually looked for alternatives, as “the once-reliable intelligentsia and the professional classes were chafing under Mossadeq’s authoritarianism” . Critics within his own circle criticized him “for dissolving the parliament and giving the Shah full authority” .

Leadership Style Problems: Even sympathetic historian Christopher de Bellaigue notes Mossadegh’s “leadership style — theatrical, idealistic, heroic, suspicious” and that “he allowed his domestic enemies the freedom to hatch plots against him, all the while alienating former allies” .

Religious and Social Opposition

Clerical Opposition: Leading Shia clerics opposed Mossadegh, including Ayatollah Mohammad-Hossein Borujerdi, who “welcomed the Shah back to Iran after the coup,” and Ayatollah Kashani, who “moved from supporting Mossadegh to a fatwa in July 1953 condemning his proposal for a referendum” .

Alienation of Multiple Groups: His secularism “alienated Iran’s Shiite clergy and the pious rural population, then a majority of Iranian citizens,” while his economic policies “alienated Iran’s middle class” .

Revisionist Historical Analysis

Myth vs. Reality: Recent scholarship by figures like Darioush Bayandor and Peter Theroux argues that “Mossadegh was not democratically elected. He was not a democrat. He was not overthrown by the CIA, but by domestic forces he had repeatedly manipulated or misunderstood” .

Contemporary Opposition: A former CIA analyst noted that “his removal from power sparked mostly public indifference and some celebration. His contemporaries, including many former supporters, were glad to see him go” .

The Nuanced Academic Consensus

While acknowledging Mossadegh’s legitimate role in oil nationalization and anti-colonial resistance, scholars suggest he should be remembered as “an iconic figure who strived to nationalize the Iranian oil” but “should not be idolized” . His supporters were “elite nationalists, with somewhat dubious democratic credentials” .

This counter-narrative doesn’t negate the problematic nature of foreign intervention, but it challenges the simplified portrayal of Mossadegh as an unambiguous democratic hero, revealing a more complex figure whose authoritarian tendencies and political miscalculations contributed to his downfall.